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53 
ANOTHER LOOK AT SKELLY OIL AND FRANCHISE TAX 
BOARD 
Paul E. Salamanca* 
 In recent years, members of the Supreme Court of the United 
States have twice cited Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.1 for 
the proposition that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,2 which 
Congress enacted in 1934, is “procedural only” and does not enlarge 
the scope of federal jurisdiction.3  By this, they probably mean that 
Skelly allows no case into federal court in the presence of the act that 
could not find its way there in its absence.4  But whether this 
assertion is accurate today, or was accurate in 1950 when Justice 
Frankfurter wrote Skelly, is not entirely clear.  Depending on how 
one reads Skelly and how one defines “enlargement,” the act as 
currently interpreted may in fact “enlarge” the scope of federal 
jurisdiction, and it may even have done so under Skelly.  In 
particular, Skelly may construe the act to allow certain cases to be 
heard in federal court earlier than they might otherwise have been 
 
* Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.  I 
appreciate the help of Richard Ausness, Scott Bauries, Mary Davis, Chris Frost, Brian Frye, Jeff 
Kaplan, Mark Kightlinger, Kathy Moore, Bob Schwemm, Beau Steenken, and Stephen Wilson 
in writing this article. 
1 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (2012). 
3 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014) (“We 
agree with amicus that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not ‘extend’ the ‘jurisdiction’ of the 
federal courts.” (quoting Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671)); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 77–79 
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To the extent § 4 [of the 
Arbitration Act] brings some issues into federal court in a particular case that may not be 
brought in through other procedural mechanisms, it does so by ‘enlarg[ing] the range of 
remedies available in the federal courts[,] . . . not extend[ing] their jurisdiction.’” (quoting 
Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671)) (comparing the Declaratory Judgment Act to the Arbitration Act); see 
also Robin E. Dieckmann, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Suits— 
Federal Preemption of State Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 128 (“Although the FDJA 
did create a new federal remedy, it did not enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.”).  Skelly actually took its description of the act as “procedural only” from an earlier 
case.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (“The word ‘actual’ is one of 
emphasis rather than of definition.  Thus the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is 
procedural only.”). 
4 Roughly speaking, that is.  If a party could only seek declaratory relief if he or she could 
also seek coercive (i.e., non-declaratory) relief, then the act would be superfluous.  See infra note 
49 and accompanying text. 
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heard, and at the instance of the party that may otherwise have been 
the defendant in a conventional action for coercive (i.e., non- 
declaratory) relief.5  This may constitute a form of jurisdictional 
“enlargement,” depending on how one defines the term.  Given 
Skelly’s status as an icon of federal jurisdiction, issues such as this 
merit attention.  In particular, we should ask ourselves what Justice 
Frankfurter meant by Skelly, if the Court pays homage to Skelly in 
the breach, and what, if anything, is left of the case.6 
Nor would any discussion of Skelly be complete without attention 
to its adoptive child, Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust.  Again, depending on how one reads Skelly, Franchise 
Tax Board represents either a vindication or a partial repudiation of 
the earlier case’s approach.  If only because Franchise Tax Board has 
confounded a generation of lawyers,7 it too merits attention.  More to 
the point, we should ask ourselves if the case yields a rule that can 
be applied to other cases.  I conclude that it does, although stating 
 
5 See generally Daniel Engelstein, Note, Removal—State Declaratory Actions Based on 
Federal Question Jurisdiction—La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 17 B.C. L. REV. 72, 81 
(1975) (“Although the Skelly-Wycoff rule has been utilized to deny original jurisdiction in those 
cases where the declaratory complaint raises what would have been a federal defense to a state 
claim, jurisdiction has been allowed in declaratory actions based on a defense to what would 
have been a federal coercive action in the conventional procedural posture.”).  For further 
discussion of Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., see footnote number fifteen below.  Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); see infra note 15.  In point of fact, many forms 
of ostensibly “coercive” relief are virtually identical to declaratory judgments.  Consider, for 
example, an “injunction” that resolves whether a trust has a duty under federal law not to 
submit to a levy for unpaid taxes from an agency of a state.  See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1983).  Apart from the threat of contempt for 
non-compliance, such an injunction would not differ materially from a declaration to the same 
effect.  See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Declaratory Judgment as a Quasi-Injunction, LIBR. L. & 
LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/03/25/declaratory-judgment-as-a-
quasi-injunction/.  In addition, such a declaration, if unheeded, could often be converted into an 
injunction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (“[Authorizing f]urther necessary or proper relief . . . against 
any adverse party whose rights have been determined by . . . [a federal declaratory] judgment.”).  
See also discussion infra Part II (providing a full and detailed treatment of Franchise Tax 
Board). 
6 Skelly has received a fair amount of scholarly attention, much of it critical.  See, e.g., Donald 
L. Doernberg, “You Can Lead a Horse to Water . . .”: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow the 
Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1009–
10, 1012–13 (1990) [hereinafter Doernberg, You Can Lead a Horse to Water]; Donald L. 
Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, History Comes Calling: Dean Griswold Offers New Evidence 
About the Jurisdictional Debate Surrounding the Enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 139, 140 (1989) [hereinafter Doernberg & Mushlin, History Comes Calling]; 
Martha A. Field, Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question Jurisdiction, Forum 
Shopping, and Duplicative State-Federal Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 611, 625 (2013); John B. 
Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What “Arise 
Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1835–36 (1998). 
7 See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Twenty Questions (Or the Hardest Course in Law School), 18 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 497, 502–03 (2001) (“[W]hy are there virtually no law review articles on Franchise 
Tax Board?”).  Perhaps this article will respond to this question. 
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the rule is about as awkward as making a three-point turn in a 
Winnebago.  To wit, Franchise Tax Board stands for the proposition 
that, if and only if a state (or one of its instrumentalities) brings an 
action for declaratory relief under its own laws, in its own courts, and 
the party against whom it seeks such relief is sitting on (i.e., declining 
to bring) a coercive action that arises under the laws of the United 
States, that party may not remove the case to federal court.8 
In the first part of this article, I will discuss Skelly and assess its 
current vitality,9 with particular reference to so-called “mirror-
image” cases, a complex category that includes Franchise Tax Board 
as an example.10  In the second part, I will take up Franchise Tax 
Board.11  In the final part, I will offer a conclusion. 
I.  SKELLY REDUX 
Close analysis reveals that Skelly is very much alive, although 
perhaps not quite as much so as the Justices’ references suggest.12  In 
fact, Skelly still performs most, if not all, of the work Justice 
Frankfurter might have expected.13  Most significantly, it continues 
to exclude from federal court so-called “federal-defense” and “federal-
reply” cases.14  In these cases, a party seeking a declaration from a 
federal court has a distinct action under state law for coercive relief 
that anticipates a federal response, but the complaint for which, 
properly pleaded, lacks a federal component.15  In other words, Skelly 
 
8 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21–22; see also infra note 107 and accompanying text 
(providing an elaboration and example on this point).  Presumably few parties would want to 
initiate such litigation in federal court, although such an action is not unheard of. See, e.g., 
Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 454 (1894) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(demonstrating that a state, anticipating a federal defense, brought a state claim against a bank 
in federal court). 
9 See infra Part I. 
10 See infra note 17 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of Skelly in relation to 
mirror-image cases). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See, e.g., San Diego Cty. Office of Educ. v. Pollock, No. 13-CV-1647-BEN (BLM), 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 111113, at *7–9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (showing that Skelly is still cited as proof 
that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not in fact increase federal jurisdiction). 
13 See, e.g., id. 
14 See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory 
Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme 
Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 532, 548 (1989) [hereinafter Doernberg & Mushlin, 
Trojan Horse]. 
15 See id. at 548.  The category of “federal-defense” cases, as used in this article, should not 
be confused with the category of cases in which a party, anticipating an adverse action by state 
officials (and therefore functionally a defendant), asks a federal court for declaratory or 
injunctive relief on the ground that such an action would violate federal law.  In such cases, 
the plaintiff (i.e., the functional defendant) asserts an anticipatory federal defense to a public 
cause of action, and arguably has nothing but a derivative cause of action of his or her own.  At 
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continues to exclude from federal court declaratory actions in which 
the plaintiff has a claim for coercive relief that would fail the well-
pleaded complaint rule, even if a federal issue were certain to present 
itself later in the case.16 
On the other side of the ledger, however, Skelly (as currently 
deployed) does not exclude from federal court the vast majority of 
mirror-image cases.17  In these cases, a party seeking declaratory 
relief from a federal court lacks an action for coercive relief that 
satisfies the well-pleaded complaint rule, but the party against whom 
the declaration is sought has an action for coercive relief that does 
satisfy the rule.18  Depending on how one reads Skelly, this nearly 
universal access either departs from or is consistent with Justice 
Frankfurter’s vision.19  But here one finds a wrinkle.  Although 
federal courts now entertain almost all such actions, there are some 
situations where they will not, as is exemplified by Franchise Tax 
Board.20  Again, depending on how one reads Skelly, Franchise Tax 
 
least in theory, federal courts have long been willing to hear such cases.  See, e.g., Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (declaratory relief); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148–49 
(1908) (injunctive relief).  To be sure, the Court has been somewhat uneven in allowing 
declaratory attacks where the ostensible plaintiff (functional defendant) seeks to establish that 
a particular state law is preempted by federal law.  See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 
U.S. 237, 248 (1952) (citations omitted) (suggesting in dictum that parties with a federal 
defense of preemption should wait to assert that defense in an adverse proceeding in state 
court); see generally Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 160–61 (criticizing Wycoff).  Precedent now 
suggests that federal courts will hear such actions, provided the plaintiff presents a ripe case.  
See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983).  In any case, “federal-defense” 
cases, as the term is used in this article, are instances where the would-be federal plaintiff has 
a distinct cause of action under state law, a federal defense to which it anticipates from the 
putative defendant.  See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 548.  Various 
commentators have combined the category of cases I am describing as “federal-defense” cases 
with the category for which Young is the exemplar.  See, e.g., id., at 571 n.192.  For purposes of 
this article, I am reserving the term for cases in which the party seeking declaratory relief has 
a distinct (i.e., non-derivative) cause of action of his or her own arising under state law. 
16 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673–74 (1950).  A classic 
example of such a case would be one in which a plaintiff sued a defendant for breach of contract, 
knowing that the defendant intended to assert an affirmative defense on the basis of federal 
law, and knowing as well that the result in the case would depend entirely on the validity of 
that federal defense.  See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 151–53 
(1908).  The well-pleaded complaint rule would exclude the action for breach from federal court, 
at least where the plaintiff sought damages, and Skelly would exclude from federal court a case 
arising from the same set of operative facts if the plaintiff stated a claim for declaratory relief.  
See, e.g., id. at 152; see also Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 531 n.9.  One 
wrinkle, of course, is that the Mottleys may actually have sought equitable relief, the proper 
pleading for which might well have required a description of the railroad company’s federal 
defenses.  See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the 
Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1517 (1989); infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
17 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 532, 548. 
18 See id. at 532, 548. 
19 See id. at 571 n.190. 
20 See discussion infra Part II.  Exactly what general principle one might derive from 
53 SALAMANCA PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)  
2016/2017]         Skelly Oil and Franchise Tax Board 57 
Board either reflects or defies the earlier case. 
In its essence, Skelly was about a commodities future.  Phillips 
Petroleum Co. (“Phillips”), acting as a broker, wanted to compel the 
Skelly Oil Company (“Skelly”) to adhere to a contract for the sale of 
natural gas.21  Skelly, meanwhile, thought it had validly terminated 
the agreement.22  Phillips sued Skelly in federal court for a 
declaration that the contract remained enforceable.23  Because they 
were not diverse, jurisdiction required a federal question.24  Phillips 
thought it could satisfy this requirement by explaining in its 
complaint for declaratory relief that the only real issue in the case 
was the validity of Skelly’s purported termination,25 which in turn 
depended on whether the Federal Power Commission (“Commission”) 
had granted a third party—the Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line 
Company (“Michigan-Wisconsin”)—a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity on or before December 1, 1946,26 (the idea 
being that Skelly and others would sell natural gas to Phillips, which 
would then sell the gas to Michigan-Wisconsin).27 
Under the contract, Skelly could terminate if Michigan-Wisconsin 
did not obtain its certificate by the specified date.28  Skelly 
maintained this had happened; Phillips said it had not.29  (In fact, the 
Commission had granted a certificate, but subject to conditions.)30  
Describing this dispute in its request for declaratory relief, and 
classifying the completeness and timeliness of the certificate as 
federal issues, Phillips argued that it satisfied the requirement that 
a federal issue appear on the face of its well-pleaded complaint.31 
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter refused to allow Phillips 
to proceed on this basis.32  By his lights, federal courts could not hear 
a case simply because a federal issue appeared on the face of a well-
pleaded complaint for declaratory relief.33  Presumably, this was 
because any competent request for a declaration must anticipate the 
 
Franchise Tax Board is itself a perplexing question.  See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
21 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 669. 
22 See id. at 670. 
23 See id. at 670–71. 
24 See id. at 671. 
25 See id. at 670–71. 
26 See id. at 669.  The Federal Power Commission is the predecessor of today’s Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7171(a) (2012).  
27 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 669.  
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 670–71. 
30 See id. at 669–70. 
31 See id. at 670–71. 
32 See id. at 669, 672 (citation omitted). 
33 See id. at 671–72. 
53 SALAMANCA PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)  
58 Albany Law Review [Vol. 80.1 
other side’s arguments, such that the existence of a live dispute is 
clear.34  If this were permitted, the well-pleaded complaint rule would 
become a nullity, because any party whose complaint for coercive 
relief would lack a federal issue could simply ask for declaratory relief 
as well, thus circumventing the rule.35 
Unwilling to tolerate such a development, Justice Frankfurter 
concluded that, when federal judges receive requests for declaratory 
relief, they should ignore the words of the actual request and instead 
hypothesize an action for coercive relief that underlies, or comes close 
to underlying, the ostensible action.36  If this hypothesized claim 
would satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal court may 
hear the case.37  If not, the federal court must dismiss the action and 
the plaintiff must go to state court.38  Applying this approach to the 
case at hand, Justice Frankfurter concluded that Phillips’ action 
could not proceed in federal court.39  The hypothetical coercive action 
that most nearly underlay Phillips’ action for declaratory relief was 
an action for anticipatory repudiation of contract, the complaint for 
which, he concluded, would not have included a federal issue.40  Such 
an issue, he wrote, would have appeared only in Skelly’s answer, 
where it would assert valid termination as an affirmative defense, on 
 
34 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937) (“The Declaratory 
Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of actual controversy,’ manifestly has regard 
to the [Constitution] . . . and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the 
constitutional sense.” (citation omitted)).  So much is required both by the text of the statute as 
well as by the Constitution.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (“In a case of actual controversy 
within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate 
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” (emphasis added)). 
35 See generally Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 1091, 1121 (2014) [hereinafter Bray, Myth] (“[O]ne could see every decision by a court, 
including every decision paired with an injunction, as containing something like an implicit 
declaratory judgment about how the law applies to specific facts.”).  Thus, a party with an action 
for coercive relief that does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, but that does anticipate 
a federal defense or reply, could simply ask for a federal declaration and append a claim for 
coercive relief as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(a). 
36 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544. 
37 See id.  Under current doctrine, the presence of a federal issue on the face of the plaintiff’s 
well-pleaded complaint for coercive relief is necessary for a federal court to hear the case under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and related statutes, but it is not sufficient.  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005).  The issue must also be 
substantial enough (from a federal perspective) to merit the attention of a federal court, and 
allocating it to such a tribunal must not overly disrupt the federalist scheme.  See, e.g., id.; 
infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (providing an elaboration on this point).  Justice 
Frankfurter did not address these issues in Skelly.   
38 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544. 
39 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 674 (1950). 
40 See id. at 672. 
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the ground that the certificate had been incomplete or untimely.41  
Skelly’s possession of a federal defense to Phillips’ claim for breach, 
or Phillips’ possession of a federal reply to Skelly’s defense, was not 
sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction.42  Justice Frankfurter thus 
construed the act to exclude federal-defense and federal-reply cases.43 
 
41 See id. (“Whatever federal claim Phillips may be able to urge would in any event be 
injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense to be asserted by petitioners.”).  Justice 
Frankfurter may have been a bit hasty in reaching this conclusion.  An action for anticipatory 
repudiation can be one for damages, or it can be one for specific relief—an order that the 
defendant adhere to the terms of the contract, even if performance is not immediately 
contemplated.  Phillips’ hypothetical action at law would have lacked a federal issue, just as 
Justice Frankfurter indicated, but its hypothetical action for specific relief in fact may have 
satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule.  This is because the invalidity of a federal defense to 
an action in equity may well have been accepted by the federal courts in 1950 as a valid part of 
the plaintiff’s case-in-chief—perhaps as a function of having to show lack of an adequate remedy 
at law.  See Field, supra note 6, at 623; John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1016 (2008) (“There was no Skelly Oil principle for injunctive suits that anticipated actions at 
law and reversed the parties to them: the pleading to which the well-pleaded complaint rule 
applied was the bill in equity, not the complaint in the corresponding action at law.”); Alfred 
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1129 (1969) (“To give adequate reasons 
for the intervention of equity, the petitioner had to tell the entire story.”); but cf. Collins, supra 
note 16, at 1517 (“Some of the best examples of the well-pleaded complaint rule, including 
Mottley itself, were equity cases in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to jump the gun and 
raise a constitutional challenge to an anticipated statutory defense.”).  If Justice Frankfurter 
entertained the possibility that Phillips’ ostensible action in equity might have satisfied the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, he must have dismissed it sub silentio.  If so, the approach he 
ordained in Skelly toward actions for declaratory relief would have applied as well to actions in 
equity—a decision that would have had nothing to do with Congress’ intent in enacting the 
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. 
42 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672, 674. 
43 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 548.  Ironically, in his effort to 
limit the jurisdictional impact of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Justice Frankfurter may have 
overlooked the possibility—even the likelihood—that there was no federal issue at all in Skelly, 
either in the pleadings or in potential pleadings.  See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 679–80 (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting in part).  This is because Phillips and Skelly—not the United States—had decided 
to make absence of a timely, complete certificate grounds for termination of the contract, and 
what the parties meant by these concepts was not itself a federal issue. See id. at 669 (majority 
opinion).  For a rough equivalent, imagine a bet between two parties about whether a particular 
federal regulation, when issued, would be “vague” or “opaque.”  Such a dispute would not 
present a federal issue, even though the regulation would be the focus of the bet.  In a manner 
of speaking, the regulation would merely provide a “fact.”  The Commission had granted 
Michigan-Wisconsin a certificate subject to several conditions (conditions which, by the way, 
strike the bystander as fairly predictable, and therefore unlikely to have blind-sided anyone).  
See id. at 669–70, 679 n.3.  Michigan-Wisconsin had to obtain regulatory approval from the 
various jurisdictions in which it would operate, it had to obtain approval from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission for its financing, and finally, its certificate was subject to a carve-
out for an incumbent utility in Greater Detroit, the scope of which the Commission would set 
forth in a subsequent order.  See id. at 669–70.  Whether imposition of these conditions justified 
Skelly’s termination was entirely a matter of interpreting the contract between the parties and 
had little if anything to do with federal law itself.  Thus, the Court could fairly easily have 
dismissed the case for presenting no federal question, either latent or patent. See id. at 679–
80 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting in part).  Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justice Burton, seem to 
have agreed, as did Professors Cohen and Mishkin.  See id.; William Cohen, The Broken 
Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 
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The application of Skelly to mirror-image cases is more complex, 
however, because Justice Frankfurter never addressed the possibility 
that Skelly—the party against whom Phillips sought declaratory 
relief—might have had an action for coercive relief under federal law, 
or that the existence of such an action might have allowed Phillips to 
proceed.44  There are two possible explanations for this.  First, Justice 
Frankfurter might have assumed that Skelly did not have a coercive 
action against Phillips under federal law, thus eliminating the need 
to reach the issue.  If Skelly had a cause of action against Phillips, it 
would have been one for a judgment of non-liability on a contract.45  
Although such an action is plausible and in fact well-known in the 
area of insurance, it bears all the characteristics of an action for 
declaratory, not coercive, relief.46  Second, Justice Frankfurter might 
have considered Skelly’s putative action for coercive relief beside the 
point.  In other words, he might have squarely rejected the idea that 
the Declaratory Judgment Act would allow a mirror-image case into 
federal court.47 
Given Justice Frankfurter’s general distrust of courts, particularly 
federal courts,48 it would not be unreasonable to assume that he 
 
890, 911 (1967); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 157, 183–84 (1953).  In fact, Justice Frankfurter himself may have recognized this in his 
handling of the accompanying action in diversity between Phillips and Magnolia Petroleum 
Company, with respect to which there was no jurisdictional problem.  See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 
678 (“Parties do not necessarily endow statutory language in a contract with the scope of the 
statute, particularly when the same term may have variant meanings for different applications 
of the statute.” (citation omitted)).  Justice Frankfurter even wrote a private “caveat” on Skelly 
in which he acknowledged (at least to himself) that the proper construction of the ostensibly 
“statutory” terms in the contract were really facts.  See Memorandum by Felix Frankfurter on 
Diversity and the Merits of Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Caveat to No. 221, at 106 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Diversity and the Merits] (“By suggesting to the 
lower courts that these questions should be treated as questions of fact apart from statutory 
meaning, some of the ill effects of rejection of Holmes’ views in Kansas City Title can be 
minimized.”).  Two scholars do seem to have concluded, however, that construction of the 
contract presented a federal issue.  See Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 145; Jeffery L. Norton, 
Note, Removal Doctrine Reaffirmed: Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 557, 564 (1985). 
44 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672–74 (discussing only Phillips’ claim for coercive relief).  
45 See id. at 672. 
46 See Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1106 n.81 (“Scholars have long recognized that 
intellectual property and insurance are areas particularly amenable to declaratory judgments.”); 
see also Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 552 n.100 (giving the example 
of an action for a judgment of non-liability on a debt as a salutary use of the declaratory option). 
47 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544 (noting the method of 
jurisdictional analysis taken by the Court in Skelly). 
48 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 469–70 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal courts should not hear cases where 
parties lack diversity and where the likelihood of a federal issue arising in the case is remote 
at best); Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954) 
(dismissing an action in equity in federal court for lack of ripeness); cf. Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. 
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intended Skelly to mean what exactly it has often been taken to 
mean—that a federal court may hear a request for declaratory relief 
if and only if the party seeking such relief also has a valid claim for 
coercive relief that would satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, or 
at least would come close to having such a claim.49  In fact, he wrote 
an article while still a professor in which he took aim at the very idea 
of anticipatory litigation, at least in the constitutional context, 
arguing that, “[e]very tendency to deal with . . . [constitutional issues] 
abstractedly, to formulate them in terms of sterile legal questions, is 
bound to result in sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”50  As 
Professor Purcell observes, although this article was “[o]stensibly” a 
criticism of advisory opinions, in function it was a criticism of 
declaratory judgments, arising from a fear that conservatives would 
use this option to defeat progressive legislation.51  In making this 
 
Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139–40 (1941) (refusing to construe the Anti-Injunction Act to allow a federal 
court to enjoin re-litigation of an action previously tried to judgment in federal court); R.R. 
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (requiring  a stay of an action in equity 
in order to allow state courts to resolve a disputed issue of state law); see generally MELVIN I. 
UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 33 (1991) 
(describing Justice Frankfurter’s belief that, at least with respect to state experimentation, 
federal judges should exercise judicial restraint and allow states to figure out new social and 
economic policies for themselves). 
49 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544.  A literal application of 
this principle would render the Declaratory Judgment Act a nullity, because anyone who 
possessed a claim for coercive relief that satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule would have 
access to federal court by virtue of that claim, and therefore would not need the act.  See, e.g., 
Illinois ex rel. Barra v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations 
omitted); Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 543 n.63.  Such an 
interpretation would also repudiate Aetna, in which the Court upheld the statute against 
constitutional attack.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).  Justice 
Frankfurter was not a member of the Court at the time of Haworth, and perhaps he sought to 
overrule that decision sub silentio.  On the other hand, one could reasonably interpret Skelly 
to say that a party seeking federal declaratory relief may only have access to federal court if that 
party could also seek coercive relief, but for failing to satisfy some prerequisite unique to that 
form of relief, such as not being able to demonstrate irreparable harm in support of a request 
for an injunction.  See, e.g., Field, supra note 6, at 624 (“Skelly Oil does not reveal whether the 
‘coercive action that would have been brought’ can include actions that could not yet be 
brought.”); cf. Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1135–36 (“[I]t is hard to define the stage in the 
lifecycle of a dispute when only the declaratory judgment is available. . . . The beginning of this 
stage is marked out by the strictures of Article III, . . . [i]ts end is marked by the availability of 
the injunction . . . .”). 
50 Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1003 (1924).  
Justice Frankfurter went on to write: “The reports are strewn with wrecks of legislation 
considered in vacuo and torn out of the context of life which evoked the legislation and alone 
made it intelligible.”  Id.; see also Samuel Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 
1299 (2010) [hereinafter Bray, Preventative Adjudication] (“[T]here would be enormous 
administrative costs and error costs from a system that generated legally binding answers to 
any question a person might ask . . . .”).  Professors Doernberg and Mushlin also discuss this 
article by Justice Frankfurter in their piece on Skelly and Franchise Tax Board.  See Doernberg 
& Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 571 n.190. 
51 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, 
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argument, of course, Justice Frankfurter might have overlooked a 
possible distinction between two different kinds of mirror-image 
cases: those in which the party seeking declaratory relief has a 
distinct underlying claim for coercive relief, such as an action for 
breach of contract, and those in which the party seeking declaratory 
relief seeks only to prevent someone else from bringing an adverse 
claim.52  In the latter context, as Professor Harrison has argued, the 
plaintiff’s cause of action can be seen as entirely derivative of the 
defendant’s, in the sense that the one would not exist without the 
other.53  But this distinction may have been too gossamer to affect 
Justice Frankfurter’s position.  With a little imagination, after all, a 
suit to restrain another suit can be analogized to an action in equity 
to restrain a trespass or an action for malicious prosecution.54  
 
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 127 (2000) (“Frankfurter argued that all procedural devices that 
accelerated judgment served primarily to strengthen the power of the judiciary over the 
legislature and to restrict the possibilities of intelligent social legislation.”); see also Frankfurter, 
supra note 50, at 1005 (“[C]oncrete cases under the Due Process Clause are decided not by 
taking anything out of the Constitution but by putting Adam Smith into it.”).  Justice 
Frankfurter was not alone in seeing a threat to progressive legislation in declaratory opinions.  
See PURCELL, JR., supra, at 128–29 (“Brandeis’s opinion [in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium 
Association]  . . . was directed not to courts or lawyers or constitutional theorists but to the 
Senate, where the declaratory judgment bill was literally on the verge of passage.”  Willing v. 
Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274 (1928)). 
52 See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.44 (3d ed. 2016) 
(discussing the unique facets of the Skelly case). 
53 See Harrison, supra note 41, at 1001 (“[T]he nominal plaintiffs [in Ex parte Young] wanted 
nothing more from the State than to be let alone; in more formal legal terms, they sought to 
assert a defense, not a claim for affirmative relief.”); see also Robert Brauneis, The First 
Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation 
Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 122 (1999) (“[C]onstitutional liability in excess of common law 
liability coexists with the justification-stripping model . . . of Ex parte Young.”); Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 524 n.124 (1954) 
(“[T]he personal wrong complained of [in Ex parte Young] consisted of threats of a multiplicity 
of prosecutions, a very dubious tort under state law.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1479 n.218 (1987) (“Young itself, for example, involved no 
individual private law tort by the defendant . . . .”). 
54 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 153 (1908) (raising this issue); Collins, supra note 16, 
at 1514 (“[A]lthough a common law cause of action in Young was not immediately apparent, the 
Court considered the enforcement of confiscatory rate schedules in state court to be akin to 
trespass.”); David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 69, 86 (2011) (“The Court’s language [in Young] speaks not in terms of the prospective 
defendant bringing suit to assert an anticipated defense to an enforcement action but rather of 
the plaintiff’s objective of preventing a constitutional wrong analogous to a traditional trespass 
on, or seizure of, the plaintiff’s property.”); Sina Kian, Note, Pleading Sovereign Immunity: The 
Doctrinal Underpinnings of Hans v. Louisiana and Ex Parte Young, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 
1275 (2009) (“[The] rate structure [in Young] was arguably unconstitutional—and if it was, then 
the rates enforced by officers were trespassory and, thus, created a cause of action against those 
officers.”); but cf. Shapiro, supra, at 77 (suggesting that tangible property was not at stake in 
Young and that courts had yet to recognize the tort of malicious prosecution fully by 1908).  
Even today, the exact nature of the cause of action in a case like Young is not entirely clear.  
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Professors Doernberg and Mushlin may therefore be correct when 
they argue that under Skelly, “the sole type of declaratory judgment 
case qualifying for federal question jurisdiction is one in which the 
plaintiff would have had a coercive claim presenting a federal 
question.”55 
To be sure, Skelly contains language that supports such a reading. 
“[A] suggestion of one party,” wrote Justice Frankfurter, “that the 
other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, does not make the suit one arising under that 
Constitution or those laws.”56  Although “claim” could refer simply to 
a defense, such use of that word would be unconventional, at least to 
modern ears. 
On the other hand, this language appears toward the end of a long 
paragraph in which Justice Frankfurter devotes all of his attention 
to federal defense or federal reply cases, not mirror-image cases.57  
Moreover, he took these words from Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ 
Bank, which itself was a federal-defense case.58  In that case, the 
state went to federal court to collect a tax from certain banks that 
objected that the tax impaired an obligation of contract.59  The banks 
thus had a federal defense to the state’s coercive action under state 
law,60 but they themselves had no federal cause of action, as would 
be required in a mirror-image situation.61  In fact, even Professors 
Doernberg and Mushlin acknowledge that Justice Frankfurter may 
have accepted the mirror-image case as a beneficiary of the act.62  As 
they point out, Skelly includes a citation to a note that approved 
 
See Shapiro, supra, at 82 (“I am far from clear that Young must be regarded as establishing the 
existence of a federal cause of action to enjoin wrongful conduct by a government official . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  Only two terms ago, the Court rejected the description of such a case as a 
direct action on the Supremacy Clause.  See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 1378, 1383–84 (2015). 
55 Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 548. 
56 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950) (quoting Tennessee v. 
Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894)). 
57 See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 672. 
58 See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 464. 
59 See id. at 464–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
60 See id. at 464 (majority opinion).   
61 See id. at 464–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  As noted earlier, however, parties subject to 
state or local regulations that arguably violate federal law usually may bring an action in equity 
or for declaratory relief to preclude application of that regulation to their conduct.  See 
discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text.  In the case of a tax, however, the Tax 
Injunction Act might preclude access to federal court independent of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule and its progeny.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).  It should be borne in mind, however, that 
the bank was actually the defendant in Union & Planters’ Bank, and that the state itself had 
sought a federal forum for the litigation.  See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 464–65 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  
62 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 571 n.190. 
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federal jurisdiction over mirror-image cases.63  “The problem we 
address[,]” the professors write, “may be the interpretation of Skelly 
by others afterwards, not Skelly itself.”64 
The evidence is therefore inconclusive as to whether Justice 
Frankfurter himself meant to exclude mirror-image cases from 
federal court in Skelly.  In an important sense, however, allowing a 
mirror-image case into federal court only “expands” federal 
jurisdiction in a temporal way,65 and therefore might not have 
offended Justice Frankfurter’s jurisdictional sensibilities, at least 
outside the context of an anticipatory constitutional attack on 
legislation.66  That is, accepting such an action merely allows a 
federal court to hear a case at the instance of the conventional 
defendant in a coercive federal action, rather than requiring the court 
to wait until the conventional plaintiff elects to sue.67  Whether the 
court waits or not, the abstract power of the court to hear the case is 
the same.  To be sure, allowing federal courts to hear mirror-image 
cases eliminates the conventional plaintiff’s ability to control access 
to federal courts, which does relax one control on federal 
jurisdiction.68  Thus, whether allowing mirror-image cases into 
 
63 See id. at 571 n.190. 
64 Id.  Their primary thesis, however, appears to be that Justice Frankfurter intended to 
exclude mirror-image cases from the federal courts.  See id. at 548. 
65 See id. at 571–72. 
66 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.  Justice Frankfurter also may not have 
foreseen the federalist reaction to the trajectory of Ex parte Young at the close of the 1960s.  
Under Younger, for example, federal courts will not ordinarily enjoin criminal prosecutions 
pending in state court.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 4041 (1971).  In addition, although 
such courts are willing to grant declaratory relief to people who have a ripe case but who are 
not in fact being prosecuted, the Court has emphasized the ultimately discretionary nature of 
such relief, noting the presence of the word “may” in the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.  
See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007); Wilton v. Seven Falls 
Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (“Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been 
understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether 
to declare the rights of litigants.”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974); see also Wm. 
Grayson Lambert, Unmixing the Mess: Resolving the Circuit Split Over the Brillhart/Wilton 
Doctrine and Mixed Complaints, 64 KAN. L. REV. 793, 80809 (2016) (discussing this notion of 
discretion in the context of a particular line of cases). 
67 See generally Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 564 (offering an 
example of a mirror-image federal question action). 
68 See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 544.  The ability of the 
conventional defendant to bring an anticipatory action for declaratory relief can also affect the 
location of the litigation.  See Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of 
Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1067 
(2012) (“[M]any declaratory judgment actions are filed by accused infringers to control the forum 
and timing of suit because they can secure a significant advantage when the cases go to trial.”); 
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000).  Judge Moore has also found that juries are less likely to 
uphold patents when a putative infringer brings an action for declaratory relief than when a 
putative patentee brings an action for infringement.  See Moore, supra, at 368.  Of course, 
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federal court “expands” federal jurisdiction is largely a matter of 
perception.  If one sees accelerated access (at the instance of a 
conventional defendant) as an “expansion” of jurisdiction, then 
current members of the United States Supreme Court are incorrect 
when they describe the effect of the Declaratory Judgment Act as 
“procedural only.”69  If, by contrast, one sees such access as merely a 
temporal adjustment, then these descriptions are accurate.70  As 
several scholars have observed, anticipatory litigation can yield 
efficient results.71 
But whether or not mirror-image cases “expand” federal 
jurisdiction, the fact remains that the Court has refused to allow 
federal courts to hear a sub-category of such cases exemplified by the 
oft-maligned Franchise Tax Board v. Constructive Laborers Vacation 
Trust.  Analyzing this case will go a long way toward determining the 
current operative effect of Skelly. 
II.  FRANCHISE TAX BOARD REDUX 
Franchise Tax Board began as an action in state court by 
California’s equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service, the 
Franchise Tax Board (“Board”).72  The complaint had two counts.  The 
first count was a coercive action, a claim for current and future money 
owed.73  According to the Board, the Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust (“Trust”) was holding assets on behalf of certain people who 
were delinquent in their taxes, and the Trust had a duty to render 
those assets to the Board to satisfy those delinquencies.74  The second 
count was an action under California’s Declaratory Judgment Act for 
 
limiting access to declaratory relief might not materially reduce strategic behavior.  For 
example, someone accused of infringing a patent who seeks to avoid the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit might choose to sue the putative infringee for antitrust, 
provoking a counterclaim for infringement, appeal for which (from a federal district court) would 
lie in a regional circuit rather than the Federal Circuit because of Holmes.  S e e  Holmes Grp., 
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 827–30 (2002); C. Scott Hemphill, 
Deciding Who Decides Intellectual Property Appeals, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 380 (2009).  In 
Holmes, the Court held that the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from cases 
in which the complaint lacked a claim of patent infringement, even if the counterclaim in such 
cases includes such a claim.  See Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 830. 
69 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
70 See Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1134. 
71 See, e.g., Bray, Preventative Adjudication, supra note 50, at 1278 (“[T]here are two 
categories of cases in which discounting is pervasively inadequate and preventive adjudication 
is therefore necessary: uncertainty about legal status, and ‘clouded’ ownership of property.”); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 683, 690−92 (1994). 
72 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 5 (1983). 
73 See id. at 5−7. 
74 See id. 
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a declaration that the Trust had to submit to similar levies from the 
Board in the future, notwithstanding the Trust’s apparent position 
that federal law forbade it from doing so.75  After the Board brought 
its action in state court, the Trust removed.76 
A unanimous Court, per Justice Brennan, held that federal 
jurisdiction was not proper.77  Justice Brennan made short work of 
the first count.78  Its elements were simple and lacked a federal issue, 
he said.79  Simply, the Court found that the Trust owed the Board 
money under the laws of California, and that the Trust had refused 
to submit to the Board’s levy.80  To be sure, the Trust may have had 
an affirmative defense under federal law, but such a defense was 
irrelevant under the well-pleaded complaint rule.81 
The second count was a little more complicated.  As an initial 
matter, Justice Brennan had to explain why Skelly applied, even 
though the Board had asked for relief under California’s Declaratory 
Judgment Act, not the federal one.82  The Court sensibly concluded 
that Skelly’s purposes would be undermined if it were not applied to 
a state declaratory action removed to federal court.83  In fact, Skelly 
made even more sense here than in its original context, because here 
the plaintiff had chosen state court and was resisting federal 
jurisdiction.84 
Justice Brennan then had to apply Skelly.85  That is, he had to 
hypothesize a complaint for coercive relief that underlay the Board’s 
request for a declaration.86  But this complaint was only 
“hypothetical” in a nominal sense, because the Board had pleaded it 
as its first count—its coercive action for current and future money 
 
75 See id.  Arguably, the Board could have sought only coercive relief and relied on stare 
decisis to support similar actions in the future.  See Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1121.  As 
noted above, every judicial award of relief relies on some supporting legal principle, which 
constitutes a “declaration” of the rights and duties of the parties, however denominated.  See 
supra note 20. 
76 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 7. 
77 See id. at 7. 
78 See id. at 13−14. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. at 18. 
83 See id. at 18–19.  To complete the analytical loop for Justice Brennan, if the Court did not 
apply Skelly to an action under state law for declaratory relief, a future Phillips could simply 
include a count along those lines in its complaint against a future Skelly and bring the action 
in federal court. 
84 See id. at 7. 
85 See id. at 19–21. 
86 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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owed.87  Because this coercive action failed the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, Skelly appeared to preclude federal jurisdiction.88 
But this preliminary conclusion was complicated by the presence 
of an apparently coercive action in the Trust.89  Section 502(a)(3) of 
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 
appears to authorize parties like the trustees to bring an action in 
equity in federal court to clarify their rights and duties under the 
statute.90  Franchise Tax Board thus appeared to present an issue 
that Justice Frankfurter had left unresolved in Skelly—whether a 
federal court may hear a case where the party seeking declaratory 
relief lacks an underlying action for coercive relief that satisfies the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, but the party against whom the 
declaration is sought possesses such an action.91  Thus, if Justice 
Frankfurter meant to construe the federal Declaratory Judgment Act 
to preclude mirror-image cases in Skelly, the effect of his work would 
not be felt until a case like Franchise Tax Board. 
Further complicating this analysis was the fact that, by the time of 
Franchise Tax Board, lower federal courts were routinely 
entertaining mirror-image cases under the act, even though the 
Court itself had never addressed such a case.92  To his credit, Justice 
 
87 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5–7. 
88 See id. at 13–14. 
89 I say “apparently” because the Trust’s action bore many of the characteristics of an action 
for declaratory relief.  This may have been, but probably was not, a factor in the Court’s analysis.  
See discussion infra notes 174–80. 
90 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the 
plan[.]”); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 (noting that the trustees would have qualified as 
“fiduciar[ies]” under this language).  Whether ERISA section 502(a)(3) in fact would have 
authorized the trustees to bring an action in equity to clarify their duties vis-à-vis the Board is 
not entirely clear, even though Justice Brennan seemed to assume as much in Franchise Tax 
Board.  See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 20 n.21.  Although section 502(a)(3) authorizes 
parties like the trustees to seek equitable relief, it does not refer specifically to “clarification” or 
“rights,” whereas a nearby paragraph in the same sub-section, section 502(a)(1), actually does 
use such words, or at least their cognates.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (“A civil action may 
be brought . . . by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms 
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan[.]”).  A conventional application of the maxim expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius might therefore suggest that parties like the Trust could not use 
section 502(a)(3) to seek clarification of their rights and duties under ERISA.  The Court has 
struggled somewhat with the proper scope of relief under section 502(a)(3).  See infra notes 178–
80 and accompanying text.  Apart from the foregoing complications, there is also the wrinkle 
that the Tax Injunction Act might have prevented the trustees from attacking the Board’s levy 
in federal court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1341; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. at 20 n.21. 
91 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19. 
92 See, e.g., infra note 93. 
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Brennan acknowledged this trend, noting in the text of the opinion 
that federal courts “regularly” heard such cases,93 and noting in a 
footnote that such “courts ha[d] consistently adjudicated suits by 
alleged patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, on the theory 
that an infringement suit by the declaratory judgment defendant 
would raise a federal question over which the federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction.”94 
What was the Court to do?  On the one hand, Skelly stood for the 
proposition that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act is “procedural 
only” and does not enlarge the scope of federal jurisdiction.95  
Moreover, in Franchise Tax Board, a state was seeking to enforce its 
own rights in its own courts as a plaintiff, implicating strong 
federalist concerns.96  On the other hand, letting federal courts 
entertain requests for declaratory relief in the mirror-image situation 
arguably does not “enlarge” federal jurisdiction—it merely 
accelerates it—and lower federal courts were routinely allowing such 
actions to proceed.97  In addition, Congress had a strong reason to 
want federal courts to establish a uniform set of rules governing the 
rights and duties of such entities as the Trust.98 
The doctrinally uncomplicated answer would have been to allow 
the federal courts to entertain the dispute.  This would have been 
consistent with the trajectory of cases in the lower courts that Justice 
Brennan had acknowledged, and it would have eliminated any 
lingering uncertainty about whether the Declaratory Judgment Act 
authorizes federal courts to hear cases in the mirror-image context.99 
But here yet another complicating factor must be introduced into 
the analysis.  Even where the well-pleaded complaint rule is 
satisfied, as it arguably is (in an oblique sense) in the mirror-image 
context, federal courts will still ask if the federal issue is 
“substantial” enough to merit federal judicial attention.100  If not, 
 
93 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 (“Federal courts have regularly taken original 
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant 
brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal 
question.”). 
94 Id. at 19 n.19 (citing E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 
1937)). 
95 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (quoting Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)). 
96 See generally Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 (“Appellant Franchise Tax Board is a 
California agency charged with enforcement of that [s]tate’s personal income tax law . . . [and 
it] filed a complaint in state court . . . .”). 
97 See id. at 19. 
98 See id. at 19–21. 
99 See id. at 19–20. 
100 See id. at 13. 
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they will reject the case, even though it literally satisfies the rule.101  
The word “substantial” here is something of a term of art, however.  
The true—but not particularly useful—test is whether, all things 
considered, federal jurisdiction is appropriate.102  As Justice Brennan 
explained in Franchise Tax Board, the statutory concept of “[‘arising 
under’] has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition 
for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, 
the original jurisdiction of the district courts.”103 
An early example of this principle in action is Moore v. Chesapeake 
& Ohio Railway Co.104  In this case, Moore brought two counts 
invoking three statutory actions against the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Co. (“C&O”) in federal court, alleging that he had sustained 
injuries because of a “defective uncoupling lever” in the C&O’s yards 
in Russell, Kentucky.105  The first count was for violation of the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the federal Safety Appliance 
Acts, which combined governed injuries in interstate commerce, and 
the second was for violation of the Employers’ Liability Act of 
Kentucky, which governed injuries in intrastate commerce.106  
Although the second count arose under the law of Kentucky, the state 
had by legislation provided that violation of a federal standard 
relating to equipment—here, arising from the federal Safety 
Appliance Acts—constituted negligence per se for purposes of 
liability.107  Thus, an allegation that the defective lever violated 
 
101 See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936). 
102 See id.  Use of the word “substantial” in this context appears to have originated with 
Justice Cardozo’s opinion for the Court in Gully.  See id. (“To define broadly and in the abstract 
‘a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States’ . . . there has been a selective 
process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside.”). 
103 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8.  Justice Brennan may have come to regret the breadth 
of this observation.  Three years after Franchise Tax Board, in the case of Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court addressed a situation in which a complaint literally satisfied 
the well-pleaded complaint rule, but the majority deemed the federal issue embedded therein 
too insubstantial to justify federal jurisdiction—a conclusion perfectly consistent with Justice 
Brennan’s description of this area of the law as cryptic in Franchise Tax Board.  See Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816–17 (1986).  Justice Brennan himself dissented 
in Merrell Dow, however, arguing that satisfying the well-pleaded complaint rule should be both 
necessary and sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction.  See id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]f one makes the test sufficiently vague and general, virtually any set of results 
can be ‘reconciled.’” (citation omitted)). 
104 Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934). 
105 See id. at 207–08. 
106 See id. at 208. 
107 See id. at 213 (“As in the analogous case under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, a 
violation of [e.g., the federal Safety Appliance Acts] . . . was to constitute negligence per se in 
applying the state statute and was to furnish the ground for precluding the defense of 
contributory negligence as well as that of assumption of risk.”).  This observation by the Court 
suggests—but does not conclusively establish—that Moore’s case might not have satisfied the 
well-pleaded complaint rule.  See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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federal law was arguably a formal part of his case-in-chief.108  
Nevertheless, the Court, per Chief Justice Hughes, held that federal 
jurisdiction was not available on this second count.109  Although the 
Court provided relatively little analysis in support of this conclusion, 
subsequent treatment of the case has settled on the explanation that 
the mere embedding of a federal standard in an ordinary action for 
negligence under the law of a state does not suffice to make a case 
“arise under” the laws of the United States, even it literally satisfies 
the well-pleaded complaint rule.110 
Another decision in this vein—although it post-dates Franchise 
Tax Board by three years—is Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Thompson.  In this case, Thompson sued Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals (“Merrell Dow”) in Ohio state court on a variety of 
state theories, including negligence and product liability.111  One of 
Thompson’s theories was that Merrell Dow had breached a duty by 
failing to disclose certain side-effects of one of its medications as 
required by a federal statute, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”).112  Thus, much like Moore, Thompson embedded a federal 
issue—whether Merrell Dow had violated a federal standard of 
disclosure—in an otherwise ordinary complaint under the laws of 
Ohio.113  On this ground, Merrell Dow attempted to remove the case 
to federal court.114  And, just as in Moore, the Court rejected federal 
jurisdiction.115  Although Thompson’s action literally satisfied the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court, per Justice Stevens, deemed 
the embedded federal issue “insufficiently ‘substantial’” to merit the 
federal judiciary’s attention.116 
Unlike in Moore, however, the Court in Merrell Dow provided a 
fairly fulsome explanation of why the federal courts could not hear 
 
That is, if the C&O’s failure to provide a proper decoupling lever as per the federal Safety 
Appliance Acts simply precluded a defense of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk, 
a federal issue would not have presented itself in the case until the third round of pleading.  
Justice Brennan emphasized this point in his dissent in the Merrell Dow case.  See generally 
id. (explaining federal jurisdiction). 
108 See Moore, 291 U.S. at 208. 
109 See id. at 217. 
110 See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12; see generally Cohen, supra note 43, at 911 
(“[A] case does not arise under federal law if federal law merely provides a standard of conduct 
which affects a state-law-based negligence action.”). 
111 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805. 
112 See id. at 805–06. 
113 See id. at 809–10 (quoting Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 
448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).  
114 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806. 
115 See id. at 817. 
116 See id. at 814.  Justice Brennan dissented, describing Moore “as having been a ‘sport’” 
from the moment it was decided.  Id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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the case.  In particular, it put enormous weight on the fact that 
Congress did not appear to have vested Thompson with a private 
right of action to sue Merrell Dow under the federal statute.117  
Justice Stevens inferred from the absence of such a right of action 
that Congress would not have wanted Thompson’s analogous claim 
under the law of Ohio to proceed in federal court.118 
Although one might disagree with Moore and Merrell Dow, the two 
cases are fairly strong evidence that satisfaction of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, although necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction 
under statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is not sufficient to do so.  To be 
sure, Merrell Dow came after Franchise Tax Board, and therefore 
could not have served as precedent to the earlier case.119  But not so 
for Moore.120  Thus, there was precedent at the time of Franchise Tax 
Board that would permit Justice Brennan to reject federal 
jurisdiction in that case, even though the party against whom a 
declaration had been sought—the Trust—had a coercive action in its 
back pocket that would satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule.121  In 
other words, there was precedent under which Justice Brennan could 
conclude that the Trust’s action, although literally satisfying the rule, 
was insufficiently “substantial,” with all the word entails, to justify 
federal jurisdiction.122 
The next wrinkle that arises, however, is that the Trust’s 
hypothetical action looked about as “substantial” (from a federal 
perspective) as an action could possibly look.  Far from being a state 
action with an embedded federal issue, as in Moore or Merrell Dow, 
the Trust in Franchise Tax Board had a fairly explicit federal action 
under ERISA.123  Thus, it satisfied the old, strict test for federal 
jurisdiction of American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.124  
Under this test, a case “arises under” the laws of the United States if 
and only if the United States supplies the plaintiff’s cause of action.125  
Under modern doctrine, a case need not satisfy American Well Works 
 
117 See id. at 810–11 (majority opinion).  To be precise, the Court simply assumed that the 
federal statute did not confer a private right of action, and plaintiff and defendant agreed on 
this point.  See id. at 810. 
118 See id. at 812, 817. 
119 See id. at 804; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 1 (1983). 
120 See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 205 (1934). 
121 See id. at 217.   
122 See id.; see generally Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (using the language “insufficiently 
substantial” when holding that the presence of a claimed violation of a federal statute in a cause 
of action may not necessarily confer federal jurisdiction). 
123 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
124 See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
125 See id. at 260 (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”). 
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to lie in federal court, but satisfaction of this test is considered a 
virtual guarantee that federal jurisdiction will be available.126  In 
other words, satisfaction of American Well Works is almost invariably 
sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction, even if it is not necessary, 
much as satisfaction of the well-pleaded complaint rule is necessary 
to do so, although not sufficient. 
In fact, the only case that jurists and scholars can typically identify 
in which the test eventually established in American Well Works was 
satisfied, but federal jurisdiction was still held not to be available, is 
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter.127  This case arose from a dispute over 
a federal patent to a mining claim.128  A federal statute authorized 
miners to obtain such patents by “staking a claim,” which was then 
held up to sixty days, during which time rivals could submit adverse 
claims.129  If such a claim was received, a related provision of federal 
law stayed issuance of the patent “until the controversy shall have 
been settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .”130  
This same provision also required the rival “to commence proceedings 
in a court of competent jurisdiction, [and] to determine the question 
of the right of possession . . .” within thirty days of submitting the 
adverse claim.131  The Court held that federal jurisdiction was not 
available, and many have construed Shoshone Mining as a rare—or 
even solitary—counter-example to American Well Works.132  Mining 
 
126 See Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9 (“[I]t is well settled that Justice Holmes’ test is 
more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district courts’ 
original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction.”); 
see also Carlos M. Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary International Law, 
106 A.J.I.L. 531, 535–36 (2012) (“Since the general federal question statute is narrower in scope 
than the ‘arising under’ clause of Article III, any suit that satisfies the Holmes test necessarily 
falls within the scope of Article III.”). 
127 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900); see, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Of Rules 
and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 
309, 343 (2007) (stating that the leading exception to the American Well Works test is Shoshone 
Mining). 
128 See Shoshone Mining Co., 177 U.S. at 506, 511–12; see also Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 
n.63 (stating that Shoshone Mining was a case dealing with competing claims of title to mineral 
rights originally conveyed by federal deed or patent). 
129 See Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 6, 17 Stat. 91, 92 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 
29 (2012)).  I am indebted to Professor Oakley for his diligence in uncovering the statute at 
issue in Shoshone Mining.  See Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 n.63. 
130 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 7, 17 Stat. 91, 93 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 30). 
131 Id. 
132 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5 
(2005) (“For an extremely rare exception to the sufficiency of a federal right of action, see 
[Shoshone Mining].” (citation omitted)); see also Cohen, supra note 43, at 902 (describing 
Shoshone Mining as an oft-cited case that presents an exception); Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan 
Horse, supra note 14, at 535 n.29 (“The Court later announced [in American Well Works] that 
the law creating the cause of action was the law under which the action arose, but it did so 
without disapproving Shoshone [Mining].”). 
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the statutes quoted above, however, Professor Oakley has 
persuasively argued that Congress simply provided that applications 
for federal patents could be held up while rivals pursued adverse 
claims in a “court of competent jurisdiction.”133  According to this 
view, the cause of action at issue in Shoshone Mining was not federal, 
and therefore American Well Works was not satisfied.134  If he is 
correct, Shoshone Mining was excluded from federal court on much 
the same ground as Moore and Merrell Dow—for lack of a 
“substantial” federal issue, even though that issue might have 
appeared on the face of the well-pleaded complaint.135  But history 
belongs largely to those who write it, and courts and scholars have 
often described Shoshone Mining as a lone or rare counter-example 
to American Well Works.136  As Professor Oakley demonstrates, it 
may not be,137 but—oddly enough—Franchise Tax Board may take 
its place. 
As may be recalled, the Trust in Franchise Tax Board had a cause 
of action that was itself a creature of federal law.138  If the Trust had 
brought suit against the Board under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, its 
action would have satisfied American Well Works and federal 
jurisdiction would have been clear, provided of course that the Trust 
had a ripe case.139  As may also be recalled, however, the Trust did 
not bring this action, but instead waited for the Board to commence 
suit.140  Thus, the Trust was the defendant in the Board’s request for 
declaratory relief.141   
 
133 Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 n.63. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 1839. 
136 See, e.g., Freer, supra note 127, at 343 (stating that the leading exception to the American 
Well Works test is Shoshone Mining); Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory 
Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1527 n.185 (1991) (noting 
that the Court has recognized Shoshone Mining as an exception to the American Well Works 
test). 
137 See Oakley, supra note 6, at 1841 n.63. 
138 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1983). 
139 As noted earlier, this action would have resembled a request for declaratory relief in the 
sense that the Trust would have sought nothing more than a determination that it had no duty 
to submit to the Board’s levy.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  Ordinarily, one must 
establish some acute need for such a determination before one may obtain the attention of a 
court.  In Franchise Tax Board, the Trust arguably could have shown this by pointing to an 
extensive correspondence between itself and the Board over the Trust’s duties to submit to the 
Board’s levies.  See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 n.4 (describing the back and forth 
correspondence between the Board and the Trust).  A judge might reasonably have inferred 
from the Board’s posture during this correspondence that the Board was on the verge of 
bringing a coercive action against the Trust, which suit under section 502(a)(3) would have 
forestalled.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012); supra note 90 and accompanying text.   
140 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5. 
141 See id.   
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If the mirror-image rule applied, however, the Trust’s status as the 
“declaratory judgment defendant” should have made no difference.  
As Justice Brennan himself noted in Franchise Tax Board, alleged 
infringers of patents routinely obtain federal declaratory relief 
against putative infringees, thus predicating federal jurisdiction on a 
reversal of roles—precisely what the mirror-image rule 
contemplates.142  As noted earlier, straight-forward adherence to this 
trajectory would have yielded a decision sustaining federal 
jurisdiction.143  But a unanimous Court went the other way.144  “There 
are good reasons,” wrote Justice Brennan, “why the federal courts 
should not entertain suits by the States to declare the validity of their 
regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law.”145  According to 
him, the Board’s request for declaratory relief was “sufficiently 
removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation” that 
underlay such decisions as Skelly Oil to preclude federal jurisdiction, 
absent some congressional indication to the contrary.146 
This conclusion could easily be seen as bizarre by those who expect 
universal adherence to the mirror-image rule, which incorporates 
American Well Works.  Professors Doernberg and Mushlin, for 
example, describe this aspect of Franchise Tax Board as 
“intellectually unsupportable.”147  Similarly, Professor Segall asks: 
“What federal values could th[e] ‘race to the courthouse’ rule 
[ordained by Franchise Tax Board] possibly serve?”148 
These are fair objections.  In fact, Franchise Tax Board is a worthy 
target for scholars who decry Skelly in the first place, or who could do 
without the well-pleaded complaint rule itself.  Most famously, this 
includes Professor Doernberg, who has written that Skelly, “though 
requiring . . . a bit of mental gymnastics,” was “workable” until 
Franchise Tax Board.149  With Franchise Tax Board, however, 
Skelly’s “true problems and another absurdity resulting from 
adherence to the Mottley rule became manifest.”150  The American 
 
142 See id. at 19 n.19. 
143 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
144 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28. 
145 Id. at 21. 
146 Id. at 21–22. 
147 Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 545. 
148 Segall, supra note 7, at 502–03.  In saying this, Professor Segall is emphasizing the fact 
that federal jurisdiction would have been proper if the Trust had brought an action against the 
Board under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, instead of waiting for the Board to initiate suit. 
149 Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason For It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded 
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes Federal Questions Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 
642 (1987) [hereinafter Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It]. 
150 Id.  In a series of articles, some of which he has co-written with his colleague Professor 
Mushlin, Professor Doernberg has argued that the well-pleaded complaint rule defies 
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Law Institute has also recommended that Congress amend the 
federal judicial code to permit removal on the basis of a federal 
defense.151 
But if one accepts the possibility that even cases that satisfy 
American Well Works might—on rare occasions—fail to present a 
“substantial” federal question, then Franchise Tax Board can be 
reconciled with other cases, much like Shoshone Mining has been.  As 
Professor Cohen famously argued, the “practical reasons” for denying 
federal jurisdiction in Shoshone Mining were “overwhelming.”152  
Many of the cases, he wrote, would turn on idiosyncratic local 
 
congressional intent, not only by misconstruing various statutes of the late nineteenth century, 
but also by misconstruing the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.  See id. at 601–07 (late 
nineteenth-century statutes); Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 547–49 
(Declaratory Judgment Act).  As a consequence, he would allow federal courts to hear cases in 
all three of the categories we have been discussing—federal-defense cases, federal-reply cases, 
and mirror-image cases.  See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, at 531–33, 
548–49.  And he would do so in the presence of, or in the absence of, the act.  See Doernberg, 
There’s No Reason for It, supra note 149, at 662.  As a matter of legislative history, Professor 
Doernberg makes a fairly strong case that Congress did not intend what is now 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 to include the well-pleaded complaint rule.  See id. at 601–07.  In fact, between 1875, 
when Congress first enacted what is now § 1331, and 1887, when it amended that statute, the 
Court would often consult a defendant’s answer to determine if federal jurisdiction was proper 
on removal.  See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10 n.9.  On the other hand, as Justice 
Brennan himself observed in Franchise Tax Board, the well-pleaded complaint rule—as 
adapted by Skelly to actions for declaratory relief—has now become so entrenched in federal 
law that only Congress could displace it.  See id. at 18 n.17 (“At this point, any adjustment in 
the system that has evolved under the Skelly Oil rule must come from Congress.”).  Moreover, 
it is now a fairly well-established canon of statutory jurisdiction that the Court requires clear 
statements from Congress before it will apply general statutes in ways that significantly alter 
the federalist balance.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (requiring a clear statement by Congress to 
overcome a presumption against preemption of state law); see also Ernest A. Young, Federal 
Courts: Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 
78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1607–08 (2000) (“[P]rocess federalism has significant potential as a viable 
means of enforcing significant constraints on federal power.”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist 
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 126 (2004) (discussing situations in which the Court 
can draw the line between valid and invalid federal actions).  Although the well-pleaded 
complaint rule is not an explicit part of § 1331 or any similar statute, it prevents federal courts 
from hearing a significant number of cases that arise under state law.  See Doernberg, There’s 
No Reason for It, supra note 149, at 662.  Construing § 1331 not to include the rule would 
therefore dramatically affect the allocation of cases between state and federal court.  See 
generally id. at 663 (describing this shift as potentially salutary for “overburdened state 
systems”).  Most particularly, it would allow federal jurisdiction over many actions in tort where 
the defendant has a federal defense of preemption.  Given the scope of the federal regulatory 
state, there are many contexts in which such a defense will be available.  This is not to say that 
Congress should not allow federal jurisdiction in such situations, but only that the legislature 
should decide. 
151 See STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS  § 1311 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1969); see also Field, supra note 6, at 616–17 (noting that, prior to Mottley, courts would 
consider all pleadings to be relevant in terms of invoking federal question jurisdiction, not just 
the complaint). 
152 Cohen, supra note 43, at 906.   
53 SALAMANCA PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)  
76 Albany Law Review [Vol. 80.1 
customs, resolution of which would not require a federal judge’s 
expertise, and allowing such cases into federal courts in the Old West 
might have overwhelmed such tribunals.153  The question thus 
presents itself—can similar logic explain Franchise Tax Board? 
Perhaps, but the case is hard to make.  We can begin by 
remembering that the Trust’s coercive action—the action that the 
Board sought to anticipate—satisfied American Well Works, which is 
generally recognized as a virtual guarantee that a case “arises under” 
the laws of the United States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
analogous statutes.154  As noted above, conventional wisdom teaches 
that only one case, Shoshone Mining, satisfied American Well Works 
yet failed to qualify for federal jurisdiction,155 and even that 
characterization is subject to valid criticism.156  This alone suggests 
that the Court reached a conclusion in error in Franchise Tax Board. 
Other considerations point in the same direction.  Consider, for 
example, the federal interest in proper resolution of the case.  At 
stake in Franchise Tax Board was the duty under federal law of the 
trustees of a plan governed by ERISA to submit to a levy upon 
beneficiaries of the plan by a state.157  Although the constitutionality 
of a federal statute was not in play,158 one could easily suppose that 
Congress would want a federal forum for an issue of the sort 
presented in Franchise Tax Board.159  Witness Congress’ creation of 
an express cause of action in the trustees under the statute.  Witness 
as well that suits by fiduciaries under section 502(a) of ERISA lay 
exclusively in federal court and would be governed by a body of 
federal common law.160  The aggregate of the foregoing considerations 
leads many—if not all—scholars in the area of federal jurisdiction to 
find Franchise Tax Board mystifying.161 
So what rationale can possibly account for Franchise Tax Board?  
We can begin by remembering that the opinion was unanimous,162 
which means not a single member of the Court argued for federal 
 
153 See id. at 906–07. 
154 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.  
157 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1983). 
158 Cf., e.g., Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195, 199, 200 (1921) (allowing 
federal jurisdiction over an action under the law of Missouri where the crux of the case was the 
constitutionality of a federal statute authorizing the sale of certain bonds). 
159 See Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 131. 
160 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24 n.26. 
161 See, e.g., PETER W. LOW ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE 
RELATIONS 608 (8th ed. 2014) (“Say again?”) (responding to the holding in Franchise Tax 
Board). 
162 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 3. 
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jurisdiction.163  Although judges do on occasion misapprehend the 
law, they tend not to do so en masse.164  At the very least, therefore, 
there must be a prudential explanation for the case. 
Such an explanation is arguably hidden in plain sight.  An 
instrumentality of a state had pled a case under its own laws, in its 
own courts, after Congress had apparently authorized the object of 
the state’s interest to seek relief in federal court, if and only if it took 
the initiative.  A high regard for federalism, a desire to reward 
initiative, and even perhaps a desire to punish sloth, all tend to 
explain the result in Franchise Tax Board.165  Of course, as Robin 
Dieckmann points out, a state that took the initiative and wanted 
federal jurisdiction over a case like Franchise Tax Board would also 
be shunted to state court,166 a result that she plausibly criticizes.167  
A possible response to her argument is that states do not often try 
this sort of thing, that they have access to their own courts, and that 
Congress could certainly authorize federal jurisdiction over such 
actions if it so chose.168 
We should also note here that Justice Frankfurter’s private 
papers169 indicate that he probably would have supported the result 
in Franchise Tax Board.  In more than one early draft of Skelly, he 
decried the possibility that entities like the Board could take 
advantage of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act to enforce their 
levies in federal court if they anticipated a federal defense (and if 
 
163 See id. at 28. 
164 See generally Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court 
Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 915–16, 924 (1989) 
(arguing that judges may lack expertise in particular areas of the law and may make errors, 
but that those errors do not go unchecked by other judges or the system as a whole). 
165 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21 n.22 (“[C]onsiderations of comity make us reluctant 
to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule 
demands it.”); Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 154 n.177 (accounting for Franchise Tax Board in 
this manner); Norton, supra note 43, at 569 (“[Franchise Tax Board is] an exception to the 
Skelly Oil rule . . . [created out of] deference to state governments . . . .”); see generally Field, 
supra note 6, at 630 (“If the rationale [of Franchise Tax Board] was limited to cases brought by 
states, it is too bad that was not well explained and did not even appear in the body of the 
opinion.”). 
166 See Dieckmann, supra note 3, at 168, 171. 
167 See id. at 159 (“Contrary to Franchise Tax Board, federal question jurisdiction should be 
broad enough to include suits in which a state seeks a declaratory judgment that federal law 
does not preempt a state law.”). 
168 The well-pleaded complaint rule and its various permutations are not driven by the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494−95 (1983) 
(citations omitted). 
169 Frankfurter, Diversity and the Merits, supra note 43; Memorandum by Felix Frankfurter 
on Jurisdiction in Skelly Oil Case, Other than on Basis of Diversity (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Jurisdiction Memorandum]; Memorandum by Felix Frankfurter, 
Untitled (on file with author) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Untitled Memorandum]. 
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Phillips’ construction of the statute were to prevail): 
This is not a bit of mere formalism.  To sanction a suit for 
declaration merely because a defense is anticipated or made 
on the strength of a federal law will turn into the federal 
courts a vast current of litigation indubitably arising under 
State law in the sense that the right to be vindicated was State 
created.  Thus the enforcement of State tax laws and of the 
extensive range of State regulatory measures could be 
brought in, or removed to, the federal courts in the frequent 
instances when it may be anticipated or is claimed that the 
asserted State-created right is invalidated by limitations 
imposed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States 
upon the States in creating such rights.170 
 The fact that Justice Frankfurter ultimately deleted this language 
from Skelly may suggest that he thought better of it.  On the other 
hand, his general hostility to federal jurisdiction is well known, and 
this language reflects that hostility.171  Moreover, although he did 
delete this language, he retained his citation to Tennessee v. Union & 
Planters’ Bank, which corresponded precisely to what he had 
deleted.172  In Union & Planters’ Bank, a state brought an action in 
federal court against a bank to collect a tax, predicting that the bank 
would raise a federal defense.173  Retention of this citation suggests 
that Justice Frankfurter was not repudiating the language he 
deleted.  But gauging Justice Frankfurter’s likely approach to 
Franchise Tax Board is complicated by the existence of the Trust’s 
action under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.174  Had he been aware of 
such an action, he might have approved federal jurisdiction over a 
mirror-image case.  In short, there is no clean resolution of these 
issues. 
This brings us to the question of whether there is a universal 
principle that one can derive from the case.  One can begin by 
supposing that mirror-image cases are cognizable in federal court 
under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act if and only if the party 
 
170 Frankfurter, Jurisdiction Memorandum, supra note 169, at 104−05; see also Frankfurter, 
Untitled Memorandum, supra note 169, at 112 (“[O]n the theory of the present suit against 
Skelly and Stanolind, litigation of State tax laws . . . could be had in the federal courts in the 
frequent instances when it may be anticipated or explained that the asserted State-created 
right is invalidated by [some federal limitation] . . . .”). 
171 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
172 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672–73 (1950) (quoting 
Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 462, 464 (1894)). 
173 See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 464.   
174 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983). 
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seeking declaratory relief is not a state or an instrumentality thereof.  
As noted above, a high regard for federalism, a desire to reward 
initiative, and a desire to punish sloth all support allowing a case to 
remain in state court if a state chooses a state forum for declaratory 
relief and Congress has authorized the counter-party to avail itself of 
a federal forum.175  Similar considerations would cut sharply in the 
opposition direction in the common situation where a putative 
infringer of a patent brings an action for declaratory relief in federal 
court against a putative infringee.  In that situation, although the 
putative infringer is neither a state nor an instrumentality thereof, 
and although Congress has given the putative infringee an express 
right of action against the putative infringer, at least the putative 
infringer has taken the initiative to sue in federal court.176  This 
combination of factors would explain the disparate results in 
Franchise Tax Board and cases like E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A 
Specialty Co.177 
Another possible explanation for Franchise Tax Board lies in the 
oddly declaratory nature of section 502(a) of ERISA.  Although this 
provision uses the language of injunctive relief, authorizing a 
“fiduciary” (such as the trustees) to sue “to enjoin any act or practice” 
that violates ERISA, or “to obtain other appropriate equitable 
relief . . . to redress such violations . . . [,]”178 an “injunction” 
forbidding the Board from imposing a levy on the Trust would not 
have been dramatically different from a declaration to the same 
effect.   To be sure, the threat of contempt would lie behind it, but 
such an injunction—if granted—would presumably have the same 
immediate effect as a declaration.179  Perhaps the Franchise Tax 
Board Court was afraid of walking into a hall of mirrors, where an 
ostensibly coercive, but functionally declaratory, federal cause of 
action sustained federal jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in the 
mirror-image context.180 
 
175 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
176 See, e.g., CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F. Supp. 784, 785 (E.D. Va. 1997).   
177 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 2728; E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 
88 F.2d 852, 85354 (7th Cir. 1937).  In fact, Justice Brennan cited E. Edelmann & Co. with 
approval in Franchise Tax Board.  See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 n.19. 
178 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). 
179 See, e.g., Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 1123 (“[I]n many cases in which a plaintiff seeks 
prospective relief, a declaratory judgment and an injunction are interchangeable.”). 
180 The speculation here is that the Court might have seen the Board’s second count and the 
Trust’s action under section 502(a)(3) as opposing requests for declaratory relief, with nary a 
request for coercive relief in sight (other than the Board’s first count, which would fail the well-
pleaded complaint rule).  In their article on declaratory judgments, Professors Doernberg and 
Mushlin take the opposite tack, suggesting not only that the Trust’s action can be seen as 
coercive, but also that it can be seen as a distinct original action, such that the Board’s action 
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This may be.  But ultimately I am disinclined to draw this inference 
from Franchise Tax Board, for two reasons.  First, the statute 
literally uses the language of equity.181  Second, the Board and the 
Trust had had an exchange of papers, and the Board was presumably 
asserting its position with increasing vigor.182  At some point, “saber-
rattling,” so to speak, can satisfy the criteria for equitable relief.183  
In the context of intellectual property, for example, a sufficiently 
clear threat to seek immediate relief for alleged infringement can 
justify injunctive relief.184  The facts of Franchise Tax Board would 
appear to satisfy a comparable test under section 502(a)(3).185 
CONCLUSION 
Like the Infield Fly Rule,186 the well-pleaded complaint rule can be 
an object of scholarly and juristic fascination.  But it also has 
practical implications for a vast array of actual or potential federal 
litigants.  Although Skelly and Franchise Tax Board may be lovely 
chestnuts for scholars in the area of federal jurisdiction, evaluating 
their scope and their merits can serve useful purposes.  As I hope I 
 
could be seen as defensive in nature.  See Doernberg & Mushlin, Trojan Horse, supra note 14, 
at 545 n.71. This is plausible, but it would require some imagination to visualize.  If the money 
to which the Board laid claim were seen as being already in its constructive possession, and the 
Board were trying to prevent the Trust from “seizing” that money under section 502(a)(3), the 
Board’s action could in turn be seen as defensive in nature.  In other words, with some 
imagination, the Board’s action could be analogized to an action in equity to restrain a trespass.  
See id.  The arguably simpler way to visualize the matter is that the Trust’s action under 
section 502(a)(3) was not distinct, but instead derivative of the Board’s action, such that the 
latter would not exist without the former. 
181 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
182 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 5 n.4. 
183 See, e.g., Bray, Myth, supra note 35, at 113536. 
184 See, e.g., id. at 1135–36.  A similar practice is in place for actions to quiet title.  See, e.g., 
Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314, 322 (1894) (“At common law a party might by successive 
fictitious demises bring as many actions of ejectment as he chose, and a bill to quiet title was 
only permitted for the purpose of preventing the party in possession being annoyed by repeated 
and vexatious actions.  The jurisdiction was in fact only another exercise of the familiar power 
of a court of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits by bills of peace.”). 
185 To be sure, the Court itself has not settled on a liquidated determination of the scope of 
available relief under section 502(a)(3).  In Mertens, it held that relief under this provision was 
limited “to those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, 
mandamus, and restitution . . .).”  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).  
Presumably an order forbidding the Board from imposing a levy on the Trust would qualify 
under this test, but the validity of this conclusion might depend upon how the Court conducted 
its historical analysis.  See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 997, 1016 (2015) (“Equity has a long history, and in that history many conflicting 
things have been said about it.  It was once said, for example, that equity would never enjoin a 
trespass.”). 
186 Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474, 147475 
(1975). 
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have demonstrated, Skelly retains an enormous influence on our 
jurisprudence, often as a precedent that can be worked around, but 
often as well as a precedent that can bar access to federal court. 
